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Abstract— In recent times, a necessity has been raised in order to 
distribute computing applications often across grids. These 
applications are dependent on the services like data transfer or 
data portal services as well as submission of jobs. Security is of 
utmost importance in grid computing applications as grid 
resources are heterogeneous, dynamic, and multi-domain. 
Authentication remains as the significant security challenge in 
grid environment. In traditional authentication protocol a single 
server stores the sensitive user credentials, like username and 
password. When such a server is compromised, a large number 
of user passwords, will be exposed. Our proposed approach uses 
a dual authentication protocol in order to improve the 
authentication service in grid environment. The protocol utilizes 
the fundamental concepts of trigon and based on the parameters 
of the trigon the user authentication will be performed. In the 
proposed protocol, the password is interpreted and alienated into 
more than one unit and these units are stored in two different 
servers, namely, Authentication Server and Backend Server. 
Only when the combined authentication scheme from both the 
servers authenticates the user, the privilege of accessing the 
requested resources is obtained by the user. The main advantage 
of utilizing the dual authentication protocol in grid computing is 
that an adversary user cannot attain the access privilege by 
compromising a single consolidated server because of the fact 
that the split password is stored in different servers. 
Keywords-Dual authentication; authentication protocol; trigon 
parameters; authentication code; grid computing; grid security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Enhanced network bandwidth, powerful computers, and 
the acceptance of the Internet have motivated the constant 
necessity for latest and enhanced ways to compute [1]. The 
growing complexity of computations, improved processing 
power of the personal computers and the constantly rising 
speed of the Internet have laid down the path for grid 
computing [2]. “Grid” computing has emerged as a significant 
new field, distinguished from conventional distributed 
computing by its concentration on large-scale resource 
sharing, innovative applications, and, in some cases, high-
performance orientation [3]. Grid computing is concentrating 
on large-scale resource sharing and collaboration over 
enterprises and virtual organizations boundaries [4]. As the 
goal of grid computing is to only provide secure grid service 
resources to legal users, the security issue becomes a 
significant concern of grid computing [5] 
The necessity for secure communication between entities 
on the Grid has motivated the development of the Grid 
Security Infrastructure (GSI). GSI provides integrity, 
protection, confidentiality and authentication for sensitive 
information transferred over the network in addition to the 
facilities to securely traverse the distinct organizations that are 
part of collaboration [6]. Secure invocation of Grid services 
brings out the need for a security model that reflects the 
security components that require to be recognized and defined 
based on the Grid security requirements [8].  Security 
requirements within the Grid environment are motivated by 
the requirement to support scalable, dynamic, distributed 
virtual organizations (VOs) [3]—collections of various and 
distributed individuals that are looking to share and utilize 
different resources in a synchronized fashion [7]. 
A general scenario within Grid computing involves the 
formation of dynamic “virtual organizations” (VOs) [3] 
including groups of individuals as well as associated resources 
and services combined by a general purpose but not located 
inside a single administrative domain [9]. The concept of 
Virtual Organization (VO) [3] has been launched to define the 
relationships between a set of grid components comprising 
computing resources, data, applications and users [10]. For a 
VO to operate successfully participants must have control over 
resource sharing policies via a secure infrastructure [11]. To 
avoid the illegal users from visiting the grid resources, it ought 
to be guaranteed that strong mutual authentication is necessary 
for users and server [5]. Users require to know if they are 
interacting with the “right” piece of software or human, and 
that their messages will not be altered or stolen as they 
traverse the virtual organization (if the users have such a 
requirement). Users will frequently need the ability to prevent 
others from reading data that they have stored in the virtual 
organization [12].  
Grid systems and applications require standard security 
services comprising of authentication, access control, 
integrity, privacy [13]. Security plays a most important role in 
providing the confidentiality of the communication, the 
integrity of data and resources, and the privacy of the user 
information for large scale deployment of Grid [14]. The 
sensitive information and resources in information systems are 
shielded from illegitimate access by means of the access 
control that is widely employed as a security mechanism [15]. 
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security, 
Vol. 6, No. 3, 2009
64 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500
At the base of any grid environment, there must be 
mechanisms to provide security including authentication, 
authorization, data encryption, and so on [33]. Authentication 
is the basis of security in grid [34]. Basically, authentication 
between two entities on remote grid nodes means that each 
party sets up a level of trust in the identity of the other party. 
In practical use, an authentication protocol sets up a secure 
communication channel between the authenticated parties, so 
that successive messages can be sent devoid of repeated 
authentication steps, even though it is possible to authenticate 
every message. The identity of an entity is typically some 
token or name that exclusively identifies the entity [16].  
Grid technologies have adopted the use of X.509 identity 
certificates to support user authentication. An X.509 
Certificate with its corresponding private key forms a unique 
credential, termed as grid credential, within the Grid. Grid 
credentials are utilized to authenticate both users and services 
[17]. In order to get the authentication from the server users 
and services are required to provide credentials. A credential is 
nothing but a piece of information that is utilized to prove the 
identity of a subject. Security frequently depends on the 
strength of the protections guarding a user’s credentials. The 
secure storage as well as the management of these credentials 
is the user’s responsibility. Usability, user mobility, and 
insufficient protection of workstations can cause major 
problems that often weaken the security of user credentials 
[18]. Passwords and certificates are some of the instances of 
credentials. Password-based authentication is still the most 
extensively used authentication mechanism, mainly due to the 
ease with which it can be understood by end users and 
implemented [19]. 
Password authentication is considered as one of the 
simplest and most convenient authentication mechanisms [22]. 
On the other hand, password authentication protocols are very 
subject to replay, password guessing and stolen-verifier 
attacks [20]. 
(1) Replay attack: A replay attack is an offensive action in 
which an adversary impersonates or deceives another 
legitimate participant via the reuse of information obtained in 
a protocol. 
(2) Guessing attack: A guessing attack involves an 
adversary simply (randomly or systematically) trying 
passwords, one at a time, in hope that the correct password is 
set up. Ensuring passwords selected from an adequately large 
space can resist exhaustive password searches. However, the 
majority of the users choose passwords from a small subset of 
the full password space. Such weak passwords with low 
entropy are easily guessed by means of the so-called 
dictionary attack. 
(3) Stolen-verifier attack: In the majority of the 
applications, the server stores verifiers of users’ passwords 
(e.g., hashed passwords) instead of the clear text of passwords. 
The stolen-verifier attack means that an adversary who steals 
the password-verifier from the server can use it directly to 
masquerade as a legitimate user in a user authentication 
execution. [21]. 
Clearly untraceable on-line password guessing attacks and 
off-line password guessing attacks are the most significant 
considerations in designing a password-based authentication 
scheme [22].  A great part of protocols for password-based 
authenticated key exchange system are intended for a single 
server environment where all the information about legitimate 
users is stored in one server. For that reason, a credential 
weakness is existed in this approach due to the fact that the 
user’s password is exposed if this server is ever compromised. 
A natural solution includes splitting the password between two 
or more servers which provides concrete security proofs for 
authentication protocol [23]. The dual-server model  that 
includes two servers at the server side, one of which is a 
public server exposing itself to users and the other of which is 
a back-end server staying behind the scene; users contact only 
the public server, but the two servers work jointly to 
authenticate users [24]. 
This paper proposes a novel dual authentication protocol 
which utilizes dual servers for authentication to enhance the 
grid security. The novelty of the protocol is the usage of the 
fundamental concepts and basic elements of the trigon to 
authenticate. With these trigon parameters, the user credential 
is interpreted and then stored in two servers which provide 
solid security evidences for authentication protocol. The dual 
authentication protocol gives authentication to the grid user if 
and only if both the servers are mutually involved in the 
authentication mechanism. It is not possible to obtain the 
password by hacking a single server. Moreover, our protocol 
offers effective security against the attacks like replay attack, 
guessing attack and stolen-verifier attack as the user 
authentication is a combined mechanism of two servers. Also, 
it provides the security to the valid users as well as securing 
the user credentials, as an additional feature. Succinctly, the 
protocol provides secured environment while the grid user 
entered into the VO and the services access from the grid. The 
remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
deals with some of the existing research works which have 
been done so far and Section III is constituted by the proposed 
dual authentication protocol, user registration process and 
design of the authentication code with required illustrations 
and mathematical formulations. Section IV discusses about the 
implementation results and Section V concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Wei Jiea et al. [25] have proposed a scalable GIS 
architecture for information management in a large scale Grid 
Virtual Organization (VO). The architecture was comprised of 
the VO layer, site layer and resource layer: at the resource 
layer, information agents and pluggable information sensors 
were deployed on every resource monitored. The information 
agent and sensor approach provided a flexible framework that 
facilitated particular information to be captured; at the site 
layer, a site information service component with caching 
capability aggregates and maintained up-to-date information 
of all the resources monitored inside an administrative 
domain; at the VO layer, a peer-to-peer approach was utilized 
to construct a virtual network of site information services for 
information discovery and query in a large scale Grid VO. In 
addition to that, they proposed a security framework for the 
GIS, which provided security policies for authentication and 
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authorization control of the GIS at both the site and the VO 
layers. Their GIS has been implemented based on the Globus 
Toolkit 4 as Web services compliant to Web Services 
Resource Framework (WSRF) specifications. The 
experimental results showed that the GIS presented 
satisfactory scalability in maintaining information for large 
scale Grids.  
Haibo Chena et al. [26] have presented the work of 
Daonity which was their effort to strengthening grid security. 
They identified that a security service which they named 
behavior conformity be desirable for grid computing. Behavior 
conformity for grid computing was an assurance that ad hoc 
related principals (users, platforms or instruments) forming a 
grid VO should each act in conformity with the rules for the 
VO constitution. They applied trusted computing technologies 
in order to attain two levels of virtualization: resource 
virtualization and platform virtualization. The former was 
about behavior conformity in a grid VO and the latter, that in 
an operating system. With those two levels of virtualization 
working together it was possible to construct a grid of truly 
unbounded scale by VO together with servers from 
commercial organizations. 
Yuri Demchenko [27] has provided insight into one of the 
key concepts of Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) and 
Virtual Organizations (VO). They have analyzed problems 
related to Identity management in VOs and their possible 
solution on the basis of utilizing WS-Federation and related 
WS-Security standards. The paper provided basic information 
about OGSA, OGSA Security Architecture and analyses VO 
security services. A detailed description was provided for WS-
Federation Federated Identity Model and operation of basic 
services for instance Security Token Service or Identity 
Provider, Attribute and Pseudonym services for typical usage 
scenarios. 
G. Laccetti and G. Schmid [28] have introduced a sort of 
unified approach, an overall architectural framework for 
access control to grid resources, and one that adhered as much 
as possible to security principles. Grid security 
implementations were viewed in the light of the model, their 
main drawbacks were described, and they showed how their 
proposal was able to prevent them. They believed that a main 
strategy could be to adopt both PKI (Public Key 
Infrastructure) and PMI (Privilege Management Infrastructure) 
infrastructures at the grid layer, ensured that a sufficient 
transfer of authentication and authorization made between the 
Virtual Organization and Resource Provider layers. That can 
be attained by expanding those features at the OS layer as 
system applications and services. 
Xukai Zoua et al. [29] have proposed an elegant Dual-
Level Key Management (DLKM) mechanism by means of an 
innovative concept/construction of Access Control Polynomial 
(ACP) and one-way functions. The first level provided a 
flexible and secure group communication technology whereas 
the second level offered hierarchical access control. 
Complexity analysis and Simulation demonstrated the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed DLKM in the 
computational grid as well as the data grid. An example was 
demonstrated.  
Li Hongweia et al. [30] have proposed an identity-based 
authentication protocol for grid on the basis of the identity-
based architecture for grid (IBAG) and corresponding 
encryption and signature schemes. Commonly, grid 
authentication frameworks were attained by means of applying 
the standard SSL authentication protocol (SAP). The 
authentication process was very complex, and therefore, the 
grid user was in a heavily loaded point both in computation 
and in communication. Being certificate-free, the 
authentication protocol aligned well with the demands of grid 
computing. By means of simulation testing, it was seen that 
the authentication protocol was more lightweight and effective 
than SAP, in particular the more lightweight user side. That 
contributed to the better grid scalability. 
Yan Zhenga et al [31] have aimed at designing a secure 
and effective method for grid authentication by means of 
employing identity-based cryptography (IBC). Nevertheless, 
the most extensively accepted and applied grid authentication 
was on the basis of the public key infrastructure (PKI) and 
X.509 certificates, which made the system, have lesser 
processing efficiency and poor anti-attack capability. An 
identity-based signature (IBS) scheme was first proposed for 
the generation of private key during grid authentication. On 
the basis of the proposed IBS and the IBE schemes, the 
structure of a grid authentication model was given, followed 
by a grid authentication protocol explained in detail. 
According to the theoretical analysis of the model and the 
protocol, it could be discussed that the system has enhanced 
both the security and efficiency of the grid authentication 
when compared with the traditional PKI-based and some IBC-
based models. 
Hai-yan Wanga. C and Ru-chuan Wanga [32] have 
proposed a grid authentication mechanism, which was on the 
basis of combined public key (CPK) employing elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC). Property analysis of the mechanism in 
comparison to the globus security infrastructure (GSI) 
authentications, showed that CPK-based grid authentication, 
might be applied as an optimized approach towards efficient 
and effective grid authentication. 
Our proposed work on a novel dual authentication protocol 
utilizes dual servers for authentication to enhance the grid 
security. The novelty of the protocol is the usage of the 
fundamental concepts and basic elements of the trigon to 
authenticate. 
III. PROPOSED USER REGISTRATION PROCESS FOR TRIGON-
BASED DUAL AUTHENTICATION 
To achieve the dual authentication, it necessitates the user 
to register with the Authentication server. The procedures 
followed in the Authentication server and the Backend server 
during registration of the user is as follows. 
The users have to register with the Authentication server, 
so that it can hold a part of the interpreted password with itself 
and another part in the Backend server.  The block diagram 
illustrating the registration process of the users is depicted in 
the Figure 1. 
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 Figure 1. Flow chart explaining the registration process of user 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the users who require services 
from the VO have to register initially with the Authentication 
server using their username and password. The Authentication 
server calculates the iP  as given in (1). Along with this, the 
Authentication server also generates two large prime numbers, 
namely, a  and 'a , which are considered as the two sides of a 
trigon. It is difficult to hack the values of a  and 'a  as they are 
large prime numbers (as per RSA Factoring Challenge). 
Here, iP  is taken as the angle between the two a  and 'a . 
Now, the Authentication server can easily determine the 
opposite side of the angle iP , termed as ''a . With these trigon 
parameters, the user determinesα , 
'aaV  and 'aaP  as follows 
'
'
aaVaa −=    (1) 
'*
'
aaPaa =    (2) 
2
'
''2 aPaa −=α   (3) 
where, a , 'a  and ''a  are the three sides of the trigon, 
α  is a strengthening parameter used as the index to 
represent user credentials, 
'aaV  and 'aaP  are the Variance and the product of the 
sides a  and 'a respectively. 
With the parameters a , 'a  and ''a  as the sides of trigon 
and iP  be the angle between the sides a  and 'a  the generated 
trigon will be assumed as in the Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. A sample trigon generated using the parameters a , 'a , ''a  and 
iP
 
After the calculation ofα , 
'aaV  and 'aaP , the 
authentication server stores the α value and its corresponding 
username in a database and forwards 
'aaV  and 'aaP  to the 
Backend server along with the username. The Backend server 
maintains the 
'aaV  and 'aaP  for the corresponding username 
in a database. Hence, the password is interpreted and alienated 
into two units and stored in two separate servers, thereby 
achieving the concept of dual authentication. The process is 
repeated for all the users who wish to register in the server, so 
that both the servers can maintain all the users’ account. When 
any of the users try to access the VO, they will be validated by 
these servers using the account information and then allowed 
to access the VO by providing VOT . If the user is an adversary 
and if it tries to use wrong password or username, the server 
can validate effectively, asserts the user as invalid and sends a 
warning to the adversary. The dual authentication code 
proposed here is designed based on the fundamentals of trigon 
and the design steps are discussed in the section below. 
A.  The proposed Trigon-based dual authentication protocol  
 Taking the security as the main constraint in grid 
computing environment, we are proposing a dual 
authentication protocol, which will authenticate the user by a 
combined mechanism of two servers, namely, authentication 
server and backend server and then allows the user to access 
the VO for services. Here, the public server is mentioned as 
the authentication server as it performs the major 
authentication mechanism. The authentication procedure we 
have developed is on the basis of the fundamental concepts of 
a trigon. The Figure 3 depicts the activity diagram of the 
proposed dual authentication protocol. 
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 Figure 3. Activity Diagram of the proposed trigon-based dual authentication protocol 
As described in the Figure 3, initially, the user who wants 
the services of VO has to login to the Authentication server 
using the username and password. Here, iu  and ipw  refers 
to username and password of thi  user. The Authentication 
server calculates the Password index ( iP ) from the password 
as 





 ≥
=
−
−
else  ;
10
180)(    ;
10
3
2
n
AI
AIn
AI
i P
jPifP
P   (4) 
In (4), AIP  is the ASCII-interpreted value of the given 
password ipw , n  is the total number of digits in AIP  and 
)( jPAI represents the first j  digits of AIP . The AIP can be 
calculated by the following steps. 
• Change the ipw  into its corresponding ASCII value. 
• Calculate the three-fourth of total digits of the ASCII 
value modulo 180, which results the first three digits 
of AIP . 
• Append the remaining one-fourth of the ASCII digits 
to AIP . 
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Then, from iP , the Authentication Server determines the 
Authentication index ( )(iIA ) for iu  as 
2
)( ii
I
PA =    (5) 
Then, the Authentication Server searches for the username 
index iα  for the corresponding iu  which has already been 
stored in the server database during the process of the 
registration. Subsequently, iα is sent to the backend server 
along with iu . When the Backend server receives the index 
iα and the username from the Authentication server, it 
searches for 
'aaV  and 'aaP  the Variance and the product of 
the sides a  and 'a respectively, which have been saved in the 
backend server database during the process of registration. 
From these values, the Backend server calculates an 
Authentication Token 
iTA  and sends it to the Authentication 
server to authenticate the iu . The iTA  can be calculated as  
i
i
i
aa
aa
i
T P
V
A
'
'
2
2+
=
α
  (6) 
In (6), 
'aaV  and 'aaP  are pre-calculated values computed 
during individual user registration. After the retrieval of 
iTA  
from the Backend server, the Authentication server 
authenticates the user based on the token from the Backend 
server and the index calculated at the Authentication server. 
The authentication code (or) condition which authenticates the 
iu  is given by (proved in section III.B) 
2/1
)(
2
1
)Sin(







 −
=
iTi
I
A
A   (7) 
The authentication process is performed by the 
authentication condition given in (7). When the condition is 
satisfied, the user is decided to be valid and the Server sends a 
token called Token for VO access VOT  to the user. Using the 
Token VOT  the user can contact the VO and accomplish its 
tasks and access the resources in the VO. If the condition is 
not satisfied, then a word of warning is given to the user. As a 
consequence, the user has no VOT  to contact the VO and 
hence no resource sharing. Thus, the proposed dual 
authentication protocol based on two servers effectively 
validates the user and allows the user for resource sharing in 
the grid environment.  
B. Design of the authentication code 
The authentication code provided in (7) takes the eventual 
decision of whether the user who logins is valid or adversary. 
The steps by which the authentication code is developed are 
described elaborately as follows. 
The semi-perimeter PS  of the trigon depicted above is 
determined as  
2
''' aaaSP
++
=                         (8) 
But it is known that, 
2/1
2
' . 
)'()()( 




 −−−
=
aa
aSaSASin PPI    (9) 
Square of the RHS value of (9) takes the form,  
'.
'
2
'''
2
'''
'.
)'()(
a  a
a
aaa
 a
aaa
a  a
aSaS PP






−




 ++






−




 ++
=
−−−
  (10) 
Applying (9), (10) can be reorganized as follows  








−+
−=
''  4
'''
'  4
'  2)(
222
2
aa
aaa
aa
aaASin I  (11) 
As given in (3),  
α+= 2'''  2 aaa             (12) 
Using (10), (9) can be written as follows, 







 +−+
−=
'  4
'  2'
2
1)(
22
2
aa
aaaaASin I
α
 (13) 







 +−
−=
'  4
)'(
2
1)(
2
2
aa
aaASin I
α
  (14) 
Substituting (1) and (2), in (14) gives 
 







 +
−=
'
2
'2
42
1)(
aa
aa
I P
V
ASin α                 (15) 
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The re-arranged format of the above equation is given by  







 +
−=
'
2
'2
2
1
2
1)(
aa
aa
I P
V
ASin α  (16) 
Substituting TA  which is given in (6) into (16), we can 
get    
2/1
2
2
1)( 




 −
=
T
I
AASin    (17) 
From the above steps, the authentication code utilized for 
the proposed dual authentication protocol is designed and can 
also serve as a proof for the effectiveness of the protocol. The 
protocol devised is based on the trigon parameters and 
effectively provides an enhanced security, because both the 
authentication server and the backend server have been 
involved in the authentication mechanism. So, compromising 
a single server and enjoying the VO services is impossible by 
any means.  
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Replay attack: Usually replay attack is called as ‘man in 
the middle’ attack. Adversary stays in between the user and 
the server and hacks the user credentials when the user 
contacts server. Normally, to overcome this, the user has to 
change the credential randomly. But it is less probable to do 
that. Our protocol is robust when the replay attack happens in 
between the two servers as the credentials are interpreted and 
alienated into two parts. 
Guessing attack: Guessing attack is nothing but the 
adversaries just contacts the servers by randomly guessed 
credentials. The effective possibility to overcome this attack is 
to choose the password by maximum possible characters, so 
that the probability of guessing the correct password can be 
reduced. As the proposed uses random generation of prime 
numbers for the calculation of the sides of the trigon, it is 
more difficult to guess the password. 
Stolen-verifier attack: Instead of storing the original 
password, the server is normally storing the verifier of the 
password. If the password steals the verifier from the server, 
then it will masquerade as the legitimate user. But this not 
happens in any two server protocol, as the password is 
alienated into two modules. Hence, we can justify that our 
protocol is also more robust against the attack, as the password 
is interpreted and then alienated into two modules and stored 
in the two servers.  
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The proposed dual authentication protocol has been 
implemented in the platform of JAVA (version 1.6). The 
protocol is tested with five valid and five invalid users. Each 
of the five valid users has their own username and password. 
Initially, they have created their user account by registering 
with their username and password, making them valid in the 
VO.  The usernames, passwords and the corresponding trigon 
parameters of the five valid users are given in the Table II. 
The trigon parameters have been determined during the 
registration process as stated earlier and they have been stored 
in the database maintained at the servers. 
TABLE I.  USERNAMES, PASSWORDS AND THE TRIGON PARAMETERS BASED ON 
THE USER PASSWORDS PROVIDED AT THE TIME OF REGISTRATION 
Sl. 
No 
User 
name 
Pass 
word 
α  
'aaV  'aaP  
1 user1 admin -
3.8067649159674
07E11 
665840.0 1.2020119316
9E11 
2 user2 ascii 2.2186644627851
135E10 
108052.0 1.9450880549
E10 
3 user3 test5 1.2148984151865
493E12 
-300790.0 6.6052326655
1E11 
4 user4 test8 4.2139671410780
15E10 
 29146.0 2.1752646107
E10 
5 user5 test10 -
1.9786419670597
998E11 
 452092.0 3.377365493E
9 
 
The α  values for the five valid users mentioned in the 
Table I have been stored in the authentication server database 
and 
'aaV and 'aaP  have been stored in the database of 
Backend server for the corresponding usernames. Instead of 
keeping the actual passwords, the servers maintain the 
interpreted passwords derived from the trigon parameters. 
When the servers authenticate any user, the servers determine 
some authentication elements based on the values which have 
been stored in the database and the login credential provided 
by the user. Using such authentication elements, the servers 
generate an authentication code and validate the user. The 
Table II shows the authentication elements generated by the 
servers when valid and invalid users contact the authentication 
server for authentication. The parameters contributed in the 
authentication and the authentication outcome for five valid 
and invalid users are given in the Table II. 
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TABLE II.  THE AUTHENTICATION PARAMETERS DERIVED FROM THE TRIGON PARAMETERS, THE AUTHENTICATION CODE STATUS AND THE OUTCOME OBTAINED 
FROM AUTHENTICATION OF THE USER. 
Sl. No User 
name 
Pass 
word iP  TA  IA  )I2 (A Sin  2
1 TA−
 
Authentication code 
balanced? 
Authentication 
outcome 
1 user1 admin 105.11 0.26067301143
654953 
52.555 0.3696634942
817 
0.369663494281
7 
Yes Valid 
2 user2 ascii 150.5105 0.87044592265
49521 
75.2552
5 
0.0647770386
725 
0.064777038672
5 
Yes Valid 
3 user3 test5 171.1653 0.98813554752
03079 
85.5826
5 
0.0059322262
398 
0.005932226239
8 
Yes Valid 
4 user4 test8 171.1656 0.98813635167
23201 
85.5828 0.0059318241
638 
0.005931824163
8 
Yes Valid 
5 user5 test10 164.948 0.96569053179
7593 
82.474 0.0171547341
012 
0.017154734101
2 
Yes Valid 
6 user1 admins 151.10115 0.26067301143
654953 
75.5505
75 
0.0622628865
386 
0.369663494281
7 
No Invalid 
7 user2 asci 59.105 0.87044592265
49521 
29.5525 0.2432668150
931 
0.064777038672
5 
No Invalid 
8 user3 test4 171.1652 0.98813554752
03079 
85.5826 0.0059323602
682 
0.005932226239
8 
No Invalid 
9 user4 good 91.1 0.98813635167
23201 
45.55 0.4904012788
002 
0.005931824163
8 
No Invalid 
10 user5 user10 114.4948 0.96569053179
7593 
57.2474 0.2926946722
584 
0.017154734101
2 
No Invalid 
 
The IA  for each user as illustrated in the Table II, has been 
calculated by the authentication server and the TA for each 
user has been calculated by the Backend server. Based on 
these values, the authentication server generated the 
authentication code and checked whether it has been satisfied 
or not. When the authentication code has been satisfied by any 
of the user, the servers asserted that the user is valid and 
permits users to utilize the services offered by the VO. The 
status of the authentication code and the outcome of the server 
for valid and invalid cases are clearly tabulated in the Table II. 
This shows the effective performance of the protocol in 
enhancing the security of the grid environment by identifying 
valid and adversary users. Each user was provided a separate 
VOT  if and only the user credential supplied by the concerned 
user satisfied the authentication code. The user credential that 
did not satisfy the authentication code was declared as invalid 
credential and the concerned user was asserted as an 
adversary. This is because that the authentication code will be 
satisfied if and only if the user credentials submitted for 
authentication are properly registered. Hence, the protocol 
effectively pinpointed the adversary and denied the services 
for that adversary user.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The authentication protocol, proposed here, enhanced the 
grid security as the authentication mechanism utilized two 
servers for authentication. As the servers kept the interpreted 
and distinct form of user credentials, there is very less chance 
to reveal the user credentials to the adversary.  Moreover, the 
protocol utilized the fundamental properties of the trigon and 
the trigon parameters, made the grid more secure as the 
alienated passwords had been derived from these trigon 
parameters. This simple trigon concept utilization in the 
authentication protocol introduced a novel and revolutionary 
idea in the authentication mechanism as well as in grid 
environment. The implementation of our dual authentication 
protocol showed its effective performance in pinpointing the 
adversaries and paving the way to valid users for access with 
the VO for resource sharing. When the protocol identified any 
of the adversaries while authentication, it strictly prohibited 
those invalids from accessing with VO, which satisfies the 
essential pre-requisite for any authentication protocol. The 
development procedures of the authentication code discussed 
in our paper is a proof which shows the effectiveness of the 
protocol. So the utilization of this protocol will make the grid 
environment more secure.  
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